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LIPSCOMB v. SIMMONS: STATE FOSTER 
CARE FUNDING FOR NON-RELATIVES 
ONLY, SOCIAL WELFARE OR PARENS 
PATRIAE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lipscomb u. Simmons,! the Ninth Circuit, sitting en 
bane, held that the Oregon statute2 providing for state-funded 
benefits of all non-relative foster homes, but not those of rela-
tives, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Consti-
tutionS and provided a rational basis for dealing with the foster 
care system.4 
In a 7 to 4 decision, the rehearing affirmed the district court 
decision and reversed an earlier Ninth Circuit holding. II 
1. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (per Goodwin, J., 
with whom Tang, J., Norris, J., Beezer, J., Brunetti, J., O'Scannlain, J., Rymer, J., 
joined; Kozinski, J., Fletcher, J., Poole, J., and Nelson, J., dissenting). 
2. OR. REV. STAT. § 418-625(2) (1991), which reads: 
"Foster home" means any home maintained by a person who 
has under the care of the person in such home any child under 
the age of 18 years not related to the person by blood or mar-
riage and unattended by its parent or guardian, for the pur-
pose of providing such child with care, food and lodging. . . . 
3. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1376; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
4. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1380. 
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II. FACTS 
The named plaintiffs, Sheri Lipscomb and Autumn and 
William Scalf, were three children residing in Oregon. The state 
took them from abusive homes, and they have close relatives 
who wish to care for them.8 They sued on behalf of all Oregon 
children who have been removed from their natural homes by 
the state and who have been denied state-funded foster care 
benefits and medical assistance solely because they are related 
to their foster parents.? The district court divided the class 
plaintiffs into two sub-classes:8 those who are placed with rela-
tives and are denied foster care benefits; and those who are not 
placed with relatives or are removed from relatives because of 
the state's policy of not providing funding. 9 The district court 
granted summary judgment to the defendants after determining 
that the Oregon statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.lo The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit re-
versed.ll The Ninth Circuit concluded the State has an affirma-
tive obligation to secure the foster children's fundamental right 
to live with close relatives.12 A rehearing en bane was granted. IS 
6. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1992). Sheri Lipscomb is 
severely disabled. Sheri's aunt and uncle did not have private medical coverage for Sheri. 
As relatives, they were ineligible to receive state foster care assistance. They were afraid 
that they would be forced to give Sheri up because of inability to pay her medical bills. 
Autumn and William Scalrs aunt and uncle were forced to give up the children because 
they were financially unable to meet the children's needs. The Scalf children were placed 
with unrelated foster parents, who received foster care benefits and medical coverage 
from the state. 
7. Lipscomb, 884 F.2d at 1243. The Oregon statute actually strictly defines foster 
parents to exclude relatives. OR. REV. STAT. § 418-625(2) (1991). See infra note 46 for 
Oregon's restricted definition of relatives. 
8. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1376. The case was certified as a class action because Sheri 
Lipscomb was no longer a minor and the Scalf children were appointed a guardian. 
Thus, the original plaintiffs were no longer wards of the Oregon foster care system. Al-
though affidavits of these children were originally submitted in the complaint, the major-
ity refused to consider further detailed affidavits submitted on appeal of the summary 
judgment. Id. at 1382-83 n.9 and 1385 n.1. 
9. Id. at 1376. 
10. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1243 (9th Cir. 1989). 
11.Id. 
12. Id. at 1245, 1250. 
13. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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III. BACKGROUND 
Oregon statutes give two relevant state goals for the foster 
care program. The Children's Services Division (CSD) of the Or-
egon Department of Human Resources is required to design its 
rules "to protect the best interests of children in foster 
homes. "14 Oregon law also declares a preference for placing fos-
ter children in the homes of relatives where possible.I5 
A federal district court in Youakim v. MillerI6 considered 
the Illinois administration of federally funded foster care under 
Title IV-EP On appeal in Miller v. Youakim,18 the United 
States Supreme Court struck down the Illinois law on statutory 
grounds, without reaching any constitutional questions. This law 
denied payments to relatives who met state licensing require-
ments for participation under the federal foster care benefit 
program. IS 
California has a state funded program similar to that of Or-
egon.20 In King v. McMahon,2I the California Court of Appeals 
reversed a Superior Court order enjoining enforcement of a state 
law which denied state foster care benefits to children living 
with relatives, while granting benefits to foster children living 
14. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 
418.640(1) (1991). 
15. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1376; see Or. Admin. R. 412-27-045, which provides: 
CSD will protect a child's right to live with his or her immedi-
ate or extended family ... In determining either the tempo-
rary or permanent placement of a child, CSD will consider 
placement with relatives in preference to persons the child 
does not know. 
16. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1381; Youakim v. Miller, 314 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (N.D. 
Ill. 1974). The district court found the Illinois statute did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. [d. Summary judgment for the state was vacated and remanded for determi-
nation based upon a recent federal statutory interpretation by HEW in Youakim v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 235-6 (1976) (per curiam). The Supreme Court raised the question 
of Supremacy Clause issues to resolve conflict between the federal and state statutes. [d. 
at 234. 
17. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1376; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 606(a), 607, 672(a). 
18. 440 U.S. 125 (1979). 
19. [d. at 126-29. The Court followed a Department of HEW administrative inter-
pretation of the AFDC-FC statute as requiring payment to relatives. [d. at 132. 
20. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 11402, subd. (a) (1991). 
21. 186 Cal. App. 3d 648 (1986). 
3
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with non-relatives.22 The Court of Appeals found that the pro-
gram met the requirements of equal protection under the Cali-
fornia Constitution.23 The court refused to apply the strict scru-
tiny used by the lower court.24 Rather, it used a rational basis 
test to find that the program classification scheme served a legit-
imate state interest.211 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit in Lipscomb u. Simmons26 applied first a 
strict scrutiny analysis and then a rational basis test in evaluat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.27 
A. STRICT SCRUTINY 
The Ninth Circuit looked to a heightened standard of scru-
tiny, which is required when legislative classifications either dis-
advantage a "suspect"28 or "quasi-suspect"29 class or hinder the 
exercise of "fundamental rights independently protected against 
governmental interference. "30 
The Ninth Circuit rejected outright any constitutional 
claims of the first sub-class of plaintiffs: those who live with rel-
atives but receive no state funds. 31 The court also refused to rec-
22. [d. at 651. 
23. [d. at 651-52; Cal. CONST. art. I § 7. 
24. King, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 651. California courts under the California constitu-
tion have applied strict scrutiny to a broader range of classifications and accepted addi-
tional fundamental rights compared to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of similar provisions in the federal Constitution. [d. at 656-58. 
25. [d. at 651. 
26. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1992). 
27. [d. at 1378, 1380; see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 439-42 (1985), which describes various classifications recognized for strict scrutiny; 
see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1970), which describes the test for a 
rational basis upon which state economic and social legislation will be upheld. . 
28. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. A suspect classification based on 
race, alienage, or national origin is assumed to be irrelevant to any legitimate state inter-
est and to be founded on prejudice. [d. 
29. [d. at 440-41. The Court rejected mental retardation as a quasi-suspect class and 
emphasized the reluctance of courts to recognize a broader general principle to define 
suspect classes. [d. 
30. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1378. 
31. [d. at 1376-77. The fact that the children continue to live with relatives made 
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ognize, as a new suspect class for equal protection purposes, the 
second sub-class of plaintiffs: children who are denied the op-
portunity to live with relatives under Oregon policies.32 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 
they have a fundamental constitutional right to live with ex-
tended family members.33 It found that, in certain situations, 
citizens might have a right to be protected from governmental 
intrusion in extended family relationships.34 In the present case, 
however, the Ninth Circuit emphasized such governmental inter-
ference was absent, reasoning that a foster child is not prohib-
ited from living with relatives when they are deemed acceptable 
as foster parents.31i The court suggested further that any right to 
the exercise of a family relationship would not create a corre-
!?ponding affirmative obligation on the part of the government to 
aid the exercise of that right.36 
After concluding that the plaintiffs were not- a "suspect 
class" and that Oregon has no obligation to fund the plaintiffs' 
exercise of a right to maintain family relationships, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to apply heightened scrutiny.37 
B. RATIONAL BASIS TEST 
The Ninth Circuit next applied the rational basis test to the 
their claims of discrimination tenuous. [d. at 1377. 
32. [d. at 1378. The court found precedent for refusing to recognize close relatives 
(citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986» and also the non-affluent (citing Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 379 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970)) as suspect classes for equal protection 
purposes. [d. 
33. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1378. 
34. [d. at 1378-79; see Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 503-05 
(1977), in which the Court broadened the sanctity of family protection beyond the nu-
clear family in striking down a zoning ordinance which prevented extended family mem-
bers from living together in single dwelling units. 
35. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1379; see Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, which found in the con-
text of the federal food stamp program that the lack of government payments was not 
sufficient to find interference with the right of association of relatives. 
36. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1379; see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (state is under no obligation to protect a child not in its 
custody from the abuse of his father even after notice); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
317-18 (1980) (state has no obligation to fund abortions or other medical services); Lind-
sey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (state has no obligation to provide adequate 
housing). 
37. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1379. 
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claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.58 Under this test, state economic and sociallegisla-
tion is normally given wide deference as long as the law IS 
designed to rationally promote a legitimate state interest. 59 
The court found that there were valid state interests which 
could motivate Oregon to distribute state welfare funds differ-
ently between relative and non-relative placements."o By enlist-
ing relatives who are willing to provide un subsidized foster 
care,41 the state then has more money available for the welfare 
of children living with non-relatives.42 An undesired result of 
this policy, the court noted, is that fewer children may have the 
opportunity to live with their relatives.45 However, the court em-
phasized that the state could have concluded that the overall 
effect is a greater level of benefits for all foster children.44 The 
court further reasoned that a more inclusive classification for 
benefits might bankrupt the entire state program.41i Finally, the 
Ninth Circuit suggested that often a child's interest is better 
served by placing the child with non-relatives.4e 
The majority acknowledged that the Oregon legislature re-
quired that the program be designed "to protect the best inter-
ests of children in foster homes."47 However, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the constitutional requirement was only that 
38. [d. at 1380. 
39. [d. The court did not limit itself to the state's actual reason for the classification 
but looked for any legitimate reason. [d.; see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (in evaluating an economic regulation with environmental im-
pact, a reasonable but mistaken basis will not be struck down even if it results in some 
inequality); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (The law will not be 
judged against the lofty, ideal objectives of the state. The court will not "second-guess" 
the disbursement of welfare funds to meet those objectives). 
40. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1380. 
41. [d. Children placed with relatives may be eligible for other types of federal and 
state aid, such as AFDC, SSI, or Medicaid. [d. 
42. [d. at 1380. 
43. [d. at 1381. 
44. [d. at 1380-81. No evidence was presented that any individual child was pro-
vided with inadequate care because of the challenged legislative scheme. [d. at 1382. 
45. [d. at 1381. 
46. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1383. A non-relative may have superior qualifications. 
Oregon has a restricted definition of relative as a "grandparent, sister, brother, aunt or 
uncle who is related by blood, adoption, or marriage." [d.; see Or. Admin. R. 412-27-030. 
Oregon's preference for relatives is based on providing only adequate care. [d.; see Or. 
Admin. R. 412-27-045; see also King v. McMahon, 186 Cal. App. 3d 648, 664 (1986). 
47. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1381; OR. REV. STAT. § 418.640(1) (1991). 
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"the state provide adequate care to the children in its cus-
tody."·s Despite the minority's call for an individualized ap-
proach based on parens patriae,·9 the court required that the 
program only have a rational basis when viewed as a whole. lIo 
C. DISSENT 
The dissent agreed that normally, after rejecting strict scru-
tiny, courts focus on "programs as a whole" and give a state 
wide latitude by applying a rational basis test. III The dissent dis-
tinguished this situation,1I2 however, because Oregon has a con-
flict of interest between its position as parens patriae ll3 and its 
own self-interest in saving money. II. The dissent asserted that 
the state voluntarily assumed the responsibilities of a fiduciary 
to look after the best interests of each foster child.1I11 That child, 
because of age and circumstances, has no opportunity to pro-
mote his or her own interest. liB The dissent urged that because 
48. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1381 (emphasis original). The court found that the state 
owes a child in its custody, based upon a protected liberty interest, only reasonable 
safety and minimally adequate care. Based on other cases where individuals are in the 
government's custody, the majority found that the government is required to aid the 
exercise of constitutional rights only when that custody directly prevents the exercise of 
those rights. These cases require only adequate medical care to prisoners and reasonable 
safety of mental patients. [d. at 1379; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of 
Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989). 
49. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1388-89. "Parens patriae, literally 'parent of the country,' 
refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a 
legal disability to act for themselves such as juveniles, the insane, or the unknown." West 
Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971). 
50. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1382. 
51. [d. at 1384 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
52. [d. The dissent criticized the application of broad administrative procedures 
which result in inequities toward family interests, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
656-57 (1972) which says: 
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than 
individualized determination. But when, as here, the proce-
dure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and 
care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference 
to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over 
the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore 
cannot stand. 
53. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1384. 
54. [d. at 1384-85. 
55. [d. at 1384. 
56. [d. at 1389. Foster care differs from most social welfare programs: children are 
legally incapable of granting or refusing consent as to whether they will be removed from 
the home, they cannot freely decide whether or not to take advantage of available state 
7
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the State stands in loco parentis to the child, the court is enti-
tled to look more closely at the rational results of the program 
than when a state is acting in its normal legislative or adminis-
trative capacity. II? 
The dissent found substantial precedent for the proposition 
that when the state exercises power over children as parens pa-
triae, it "exercises a discretion in the interest of the 
child .... "1i8 The dissent maintained that Oregon law reflects a 
strong preference for foster care by relatives for a purpose.1i9 The 
dissent explained that in addition to providing the best environ-
ment for the child, many children with physical disabilities can-
not easily be placed with unrelated foster parents.60 After re-
moval from the relative's home, the state then pays strangers or 
an institution for the upkeep and medical care of the child.61 
The state ends up paying out at least as much money, and the 
child is denied the love and concern of his or her family mem-
bers.62 The dissent argued that, in light of the state's duty, each 
child is entitled to have key decisions as to care made for his or 
her own best interest, rather than to serve some "collateral 
purpose. "68 
The dissent found that Oregon's policy prevents the plain-
tiff children from obtaining the care of family members "who, in 
the state's own professional judgement, are best suited to pro-
vide them a loving family environment."64 The dissent con-
cluded that the state may not devise a scheme which presump-
tively inhibits the most favorable placement of children "on the 
benefits, and they have no right to direct what happens to them thereafter. Id. 
57. Id. at 1385. 
58. Id. at 1386 (citing New York Foundling Hosp. v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429, 439 (1906) 
(state has absolute right of parent with responsibility of 'that custody); accord Stantosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); see also In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 530 (1979) 
("When the minor must be removed from the custody of his parents for his own welfare 
... the state assumes the parent's role .... "); accord Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 
265 (1984) (in allowing pretrial detention of juveniles). A minor's liberty interest is "sub-
ordinated to the State's parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare 
of the child." Id. 
59. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1386. 
60. Id. at 1387. According to the dissent, it is likely that if Sheri leaves the DeFehr's 
home, she will be placed in an institution. Id. 
61. Id. 
62.Id. 
63. Id. at 1388-89 (following duty based on parens patriae). 
64. Id. at 1390 (emphasis original). 
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basis of a circumstance over which the children have no con-
trol. "6~ The dissent finally urged that the rational basis of the 
Oregon statutes be evaluated against their "noble purpose".66 
V. CRITIQUE 
The majority treats these foster children67 as if they were 
ordinary, free citizens and considers their extended families un-
important in evaluating the financial decisions of the state legis-
lative scheme.68 The Ninth Circuit takes a traditional approach 
and defers to the state's judgment to devise a rational overall 
program which provides for the adequate care of all foster 
children.69 
Yet, the Ninth Circuit also feels compelled to plead the in-
dividual case that, contrary to the State's declared beliefs and to 
historical precedent,70 foster children are not necessarily better 
off with relatives. The current program does not promote the 
best interests of a large class of foster children: those who would 
be aided in placement with relatives by state funding. 71 Perhaps 
65. [d. at 1390; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972), where the Court 
found that equal protection requires individualized hearings on fitness before unwed fa-
thers can be separated from their children. The state's expediency in presuming the un-
fitness of the father was held insufficient to justify separation of a nuclear family. Stan-
ley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
66. Lipscomb, 962 F.2d at 1391. 
67. A summary of federal constitutional law concerning foster children can be found 
in John F. Gillespie, Annotation: Status and Rights of Foster Children and Foster Par-
ents Under the Federal Constitution, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1991). 
68. The court found that "Oregon has no affirmative obligation to fund plaintiff's 
exercise of a right to maintain family relationships free from governmental interfer-
ence .... " Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1992). However, the 
state's decision to place with a non-relative effectively cuts off the child's right of family 
association. The child then no longer has any visitation rights with relatives other than 
parents (who may no longer be interested). In order to balance the right of family associ-
ation against the state's decision to fund and place with a non-relative, the court should 
require at least a hearing under due process. If the court increased the burden on non-
relative placement when relatives express some interest in the child, the state would be 
pushed toward increasing compromise in favor of the child's best interest and relative 
placement. 
69. The problems children face in having their interests represented is documented 
by analysis of several test cases in ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 
(1985). 
70. For an analysis supporting the importance of extended family relationships in 
American history, see Justice Powell's opinion in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 
431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977). 
71. The foster care system is in large part unsuccessful in finding foster homes from 
9
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an intermediate concession of medical benefits without payment 
for living expenses would allow more foster children to live with 
relatives. 
The dissent makes an interesting connection between the fi-
duciary duty of the state and the foster child's best interest. In 
every other aspect of foster care placement, the Children Ser-
vices Division (CSD) is required to look at the child as an indi-
vidual with particular needs. The CSD determines the special 
needs of a child and the ability of a relative to fill those needs. 
The statutory scheme then defeats the natural fruition of place-
ment with that relative' because it refuses resources for medical 
and physical essentials. The state then provides those same re-
sources to the second choice, a non-relative or institution. The 
minority correctly contends that a fiduciary duty analysis re-
quires rationality on an individualized basis.72 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that Oregon has rationally fashioned 
a program which both meets its budgetary constraints and pro-
vides for the welfare of all children in foster care.73 The classifi-
cation scheme does not disadvantage a suspect class or impinge 
upon fundamental rights of family association. It meets mini-
mum constitutional requirements of rationality as applied to so-
cial welfare programs. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that 
an individualized, need-based program should not be forced 
upon the state.74 
David Peterson * 
the same racial background as the children. See Janet R. Fink, Effects of Crack and 
Cocaine Upon Infants: A Brief Review of the Literature, 10 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS, J. 4, 
,8 n.2 and n.4 (1989). In urban areas, a large majority of foster care placements are re-
lated to drug abuse. The increasing number of infants with cocaine and HIV back-
grounds is straining the foster care system. Id, 
72. Justice Brennan's dissent in DeShaney succinctly argues that when the state 
cuts off private support, it has a duty to provide public aid. DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 206-08 (1989). In the present case, the state 
has separated the child from its parents and so may be under duty to provide public aid 
in placements. 
73. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1384 (9th Cir. 1992). 
74.Id. 
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